Disaster Keynesianism -- Say something responsive for once!

Last day in Budapest for now, leaving in a few hours. But it looks like the topic of the day is the economics of Hurricane Sandy, and, as with any discussion of economics during a natural disaster, whether it will be "good for the economy".

Needless to say, this is a discussion that has happened several times already. Still, engagement with the other side's arguments is always good -- as long as you're actually, well engaging, rather than extending and reinforcing a non-responsive (or no-longer-responsive) point.

Which brings us to pseudo-contrarian Steve Landsburg's latest pseudo-contribution to the matter. He thinks he has an even more devastating critique of the "hurricanes can be good for the economy" by posing this:

ask your opponent whether it’s “good for the ants” when you put a stick down their anthill, wiggle it around and destroy their infrastructure. Go ahead and acknowledge that this can sure put a lot of ants to work.

Or, for that matter….

Ask if spilling ink on the living room rug is “good for your household’s economy” because of all the cleanup work you’ll do.

Of course, this doesn't actually address the Keynesian's central point, because their claim is that normally such acts are destructive, but need not be so when there are idle resources (found after a quick search).

To make absolutely sure I'm not misunderstood, please read these caveats if you plan on responding:

- I don't agree with they Keynesian "idle resources" argument, and have said as much before.

- I realize that Keynesians (and their critics) acknowledge that there are always better ways to do economic stimulus than a natural disaster -- just employ those otherwise-would-be-disaster-response-resources to do something that's not completely wasteful.

And yet there's no mention of relevance of idle resources in Landsburg's post, or in the army of back-slappers or hangers-on that dominate the beginning of the discussion. When we finally do, it's from critics who offer surprisingly good analogies, like commenter "Brian", who compares a stagnant economy to laziness ("akrasia") in an individual:

Suppose Billy Joe has been in bed for years. He’s overweight and unmotivated. His life appears to continue to spiral out of control as he watches reruns of every horrible show made from the 1970′s on. But when that ink falls on the floor, this finally gave him a reason to get out of bed and clean up the mess, and the mere activity of it kick started him into action of doing thins again, and even being motivated [sic]

And the defenders of the post (I guess *not* surprisingly) miss the point that of course making new windows is better than fixing broken ones, but that's not an option here. Landsburg himself does that in this comment:

... this is ridiculous, on Keynesian grounds or any other. If you believe it’s important to hire idle resources in order to “stimulate the economy”, then you don’t have to wait for a hurricane — you can hire people to build *new* bridges instead of having them rebuild old ones. The hurricane does not in any way expand your set of policy options; it only destroys stuff.

Except, of course, that it does expand your options, since by supposition, policy makers won't allocate funds for public works projects that build new windows, but will gladly fund projects to restore the windows that were broken in the disaster. (To re-iterate: I disagree that such public works funding -- whether for building or fixing -- is a good idea for "helping the economy"; this is simply about appreciation of one's opponent's arguments and responsiveness thereto.)

***
My point here is that if you want a really hot one-line zinger for why the "hurricanes good for economy" meme (in its most intelligent form) is wrong, you're going to have to do a lot more than just say that destruction is bad. No -- you're going to have to show why destruction is not "better than nothing" if its effect is to put (only) idle resources to use, thus giving people the dignity of a job and practice of their skills, when you don't have the option (for e.g. political reasons) of simply employing those idle resources to build on top of existing wealth.

What's that, you say? It's hard to give a concise, fun explanation of why that thinking is wrong? Well, it should be. Two-sided political debates tend to be like that. My shortest debunking is at least this long

Can you do better? Perhaps. But it won't be by invoking the ten millionth permutation of "destruction is bad, m'k?".

Broken Windows, Part I: The Pain of Hard Choices

This will be the first in a series where I spell out an underappreciated concept in economics and how it leads many economists astray in proposing solutions to economic problems. I figured I better get a start on it before the New Year.

Recently, I've gained some insight into the economic debates between the various camps that claim to have a solution to our current problems. In addition to tying up some loose ends regarding a century-old debate, this insight gave me a good explanation of why standard dismissals of the so-called recalculation story (in explaining recessions like the current one) are making a subtle error.

First, a high-speed recap: Way back in the 1800s, Bastiat described what is known as the "Broken Window Fallacy" to refute the prevailing economic wisdom of the age. Many believed that a vandal who broke a window could be doing the economy a favor, reasoning that the owner would have to hire a glazier to fix the window, who would have new money he could use to buy new shoes, which would give the shoemaker the chance to buy something he wanted, and so on. (Note the early shades of the "multiplier effect" argument.)

Bastiat replied, basically, that no, this doesn't quite work, because you have to account for the "unseen" loss to the window owner, who would have engaged in the exact same economic stimulation as the glazier, had the window not broken, because he would have been able to buy something he wanted -- and we'd get to keep the window, to boot!

This mention of the Broken Windows Fallacy is often brought up in response to proposed Keynesian solutions (involving government stimulus spending), where their opponents say that it makes the same error, neglecting the unseen economic activity that would go on in the absence of the government's spending.

Keynesians, in turn, reply that the Broken Window Fallacy only applies at "full employment", where there is no "crowding out" (i.e. forgone projects due to the government's use of resources for different ones). In a depressed economy, they argue, the alternative to a metaphorical broken window (along with its fixing) is not "the window owner buys something else", but rather, "the window owner hoards that money", providing no economic benefit. Therefore, breaking a window in such a case would not have an economic opportunity cost, and so could indeed be good for the economy -- though Keynesians of course admit there are much better ways to increase employment than breaking a window.

The back-and-forth goes on, of course, with each side claiming that the other's position implies or relies on an absurdity. Keynesians accuse the free-market/"Austrian" types of thinking the economy is always optimally using resources, while Austrians accuse the Keynesians of calling a hurricane "God's gift to depressions".

But here, I think, I've noticed something that tremendously clarifies the debate, and gives us insight into why economic activity does or doesn't happen, and why certain events are or aren't good. So, here goes.

*******

Let's go back to the original Bastiat thought experiment about the broken window. Ask yourself this: Why are we assuming the window will be fixed at all?

Don't misunderstand me: it's a reasonable assumption. But we have to be careful that this assumption isn't fundamentally ignoring relevant economic factors, thereby baking in a desired conclusion from the very beginning. And here, I think we have good reason to believe that's exactly what's going on.

So let's start simple: under what circumstances would it be not be reasonable to assume that the window will be fixed, (i.e. that the owner will choose to pay someone to fix it), even during a depression? That's easy: if the neighborhood (along with that building) is run-down to begin with, already littered with broken windows. A lone broken window merits a quick repair, but if it's yet-another-broken-window, why bother? (Note here the substantive similarity to the homonymous "broken window" effect!)

So here we see the crucial, unappreciated factor: the obviousness of certain production decisions. What these thought experiments -- carefully constructed to make a different point -- actually prove is the importance of being able to confidently decide what is the best use of resources. And we can step back and see the same dynamic in very different contexts.

For example, say an unemployed guy, Joe, is trying all different kinds of things to find a job, and nothing is working. Then while driving one day, makes a wrong turn and steers his car off a bridge into the river below. Not good. But there is one teensy-weensy good part: it's a lot easier to prioritize! Previously, Joe didn't know what he should do to make optimal use of his time. Now, he knows exactly what he needs to work on: avoiding death from falling into a river!

And we can step back even more and generalize further: what we are seeing is but a special case of the law of diminishing returns. Abstractly, each additional unit of satisfaction requires a greater input of factors: land, labor, capital ... and thought (sometimes called "entrepreneurial ability"). Generally, the further up you pick the fruit, the harder it is to pick the next branch up, in terms of any factor of production, including and especially thought. Conversely, if you suddenly face a sharp drop in satisfaction by being deprived of more fundamental necessities, it becomes easier to decide what to do: replace those necessities!

***

That should give you a taste of what I think is missing from discussions of the economic impact of natural disasters and inability to reach full employment. In the next entry, I'll go further to illustrate how deeply this oversight impacts the ability to perform good economic analysis.

Setting monetary stimulus straight

In light of my recent link to Gennady Stolyarov's post about the gloomy future of the economy (especially for young people), I thought it would be a good idea to put it against the backdrop of mainstream economics and the "experts'" solutions.

A characteristic post is this one by the relatively libertarian Scott Sumner. Like pretty much every day, his idea is for the Federal Reserve to do a "monetary stimulus" by injecting money into the economy to prop up nominal GDP. (Yes, nominal GDP -- you know, the one that doesn't mean anything until you adjust it to real GDP and even then commits you to a easily-abused framework.) This, it would do by various mechanisms, all of which aim to "get banks lending". Stop paying interest on reserves, buy more of banks' (junky) securities, rapidly debase the currency ("quantitative easing") so they have to loan or else hold worthless cash, etc.

In frustration at such a stupid policy, I made this sarcastic comment on that post:

Yes, the economy will definitely collapse if the Fed doesn’t print up more money to make shoddy loans for purchases people don’t want, and it’s a shame that folks at the Fed are stopping Bernanke from such a wise action.

And to my utter surprise, Sumner replied:

Silas. I agree. :-)

Note: the smiley was in recognition of my sarcasm, not to indicate he's changed his mind.

So, Sumner realizes exactly what he's asking for, and still thinks it's a good idea. But since it apparently isn't obvious to everyone what's wrong with such a policy, I thought I'd spell it out clearly for once:

Banks aren't lending (in sufficient numbers). Mainstream economists want to prod them into lending. But why won't they lend in the first place? Because they don't expect the future loan payments to justify the loan. Now, when you grip them so tightly that they have to, for some reason or another, make these loans, have you changed the factors causing banks to believe loans won't be paid? No, you haven't. So, the loans will just throw money after wasteful projects, destroying output and making everyone poorer.

Note: even if you -- quite reasonably -- care about unemployed workers, and you dismiss this concern about wastefulness on the grounds that, "hey, at least it will lift off the joblessness albatross for so many families", that still wouldn't make such policies a good idea. The wastefulness means that reality will eventually rear its head and force these projects to be abandoned. Then, all the new skills workers could have developed while working on sustainable projects that satisfy actual demand, instead don't get developed, and whatever they did do has just retooled them for a useless activity, leaving them even worse off. Doesn't sound too compassionate to me ...

But let's say I'm wrong about that. Let's put aside, for the moment, our skepticism about economists' claims that the same policy that forces banks to lend, also causes these loans to work out and get repaid, making them not such stupid loans to begin with. Even then, you're still causing inefficient activities to happen that cause workers and investors to dig themselves deeper on unsustainable activities.

Looking back, one has to wonder how economists ever came to the consensus that making ultra-underpriced loans to clumsy, inflexible banks could ever possibly be a good idea. My suspicion is that it is a kind of Goodhart phenomenon: at the time these economic models were created, the metrics economists cared about did serve as good proxies for general economic health. But as they were targeted by policy, they lost their value as indicators.

Furthermore, economists failed to continually ground their concept of a "good economy" in what is meant by the term in common parlance. They don't keep checking back to see whether their policies would mean that people get the best combination of work, leisure, and consumption (all broadly defined). No: if an improvement doesn't show up as a cash exchange, it doesn't matter. If people aren't spending enough, then obviously that's hurting the economy and they should spend more.

You would almost think the economy is some god that demands sacrifices, given the way economists talk, rather than a characterization of our collective ability to satisfy wants.

So please, understand my anger when I read about how young people have all of their options cut off by the earlier generation, how they can't save or invest because of how much will be taken to make up for the failures of poorly run enterprises, how genuinely productive ventures are quashed by an outdated mentality of how the world should work ... and then Scott Sumner swings in to tell us that the best way to improve "the economy" is with ridiculously underpriced loans from newly-printed money to aging, inefficient companies that just wasted trillions of dollars destroying our productive capacity.

Advice for economists: Ask whether, not why.

-Don't ask, "What can we do to increase aggregate demand?"
Ask, "Why should we increase aggregate demand?"

-Don't ask, "What can we do to keep people from saving so much?"
Ask, "Why does 'the economy' so crucially depend on people not saving, and why do I care about the health of the 'economy' in that sense?"

-Don't ask, "What can we do to get (traditionally measured) output back up?"
Ask, "Why is it necessary for that measure of output to go up? Would it be so terrible for people to produce less, if that's what they really want, based on honest assessments of the future?"

Get the picture?

Fun with graphics and the environment!

Well, the Environmental Defense Fund has a cute graphic out (HT: Free Advice) promoting "green jobs":



The basic idea, as you probably figured out from the graphic, is that mandating pollution caps will give people something to do, thus reducing unemployment. They don't put it that way, of course, but that's the idea, and it's a rehash of the Broken Windows Fallacy.

This justification for pollution restrictions misses the point, of course. Assigning well-defined, sustainable pollution rights is a good idea, for the same reason that assigning rights to any scarce resource is a good idea: because of justice and efficiency, not because it would add another task for people to do.

In light of all of that, I decided to pull a SomethingAwful and put different words into the graphic, in an attempt to criticize my nemesis Bob Murphy's (of the Free Advice site linked above) sudden love of Coasean extortion payments when it comes to pollution. Enjoy!